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Some of the most intriguing brain teasers in tort law involve the valuation
of damages for harm arising from wrongfully inflicted injury to person or
property.' Consider the following example:
A wrongdoer shoots and instantly kills a person in the path of an avalanche
that would have killed the person a few seconds later. The person's
survivors bring a wrongful death action against the shooter, seeking
compensation for the loss of support they would have received from the
decedent if she had lived.
Should the court require the shooter to pay for loss of support beyond the time that
the avalanche would have killed the decedent? Does the answer depend on whether
the avalanche was caused by another wrongdoer? If the avalanche was caused by
another wrongdoer, would that person be liable for any loss of future support?
These questions are perplexing because either the gunshot or the avalanche alone
would be sufficient to cause the loss of future support; therefore, it is difficult to
attribute the harm to either cause. This Article refers to harm actually or potentially
caused by more than one force as "duplicated harm."
I once thought that the questions raised by duplicated harm hypotheticals had
little practical importance; they belonged to a dusty comer of abstract tort law and
had few implications for real-world problems. However, after mulling over this
problem further, I realized that the enigma posed by the duplicated harm
hypotheticals is not unique. When viewed from the proper perspective, it is
apparent that in virtually every tort case both the wrongful act of the defendant and
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1. In this Article, I use the Restatement definitions of the terms "injury" and "harm."
"Injury" means the "invasion of any legally protected interest of another." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965). "Harm" means "loss or detriment in fact of any kind to
a person resulting from any cause." Id. § 7(2). Thus, injury can occur without harm (a
transitory trespass), and harm can occur without injury (a loss of profits due to a business
downturn). Id. § 7 cmt. a.
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some other force, not attributable to the defendant, are each individually sufficient
to cause some portion of the harm arising from the injury.
Looking at old problems from a new point of view usually provides
generous rewards. I emerged from my odyssey through these murky waters
with a new perspective that made it possible for me to find order in this
confusing area of law and to construct a coherent framework for analyzing
duplicated harm cases. This new perspective also provided important insights
into the nature of the tort system. These insights are particularly relevant to the
current debate regarding whether the tort system is primarily concerned with
achieving efficiency (appropriate deterrence)2 or with achieving corrective
justice.3 Through the process of valuing damages for duplicated harm, the
goals of achieving efficiency and justice sometimes coincide; thus, the rules
governing damages further both policies.4 When those two goals conflict,
however, courts must choose between them. How they choose reflects the
2. Richard Posner was the first scholar to explain the tort system "in. . . terms of
economic analysis," arguing that efficient resource allocation requires appropriate deterrence
of accidents. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1801, 1806 (1997); see also Richard A. Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, 1 1. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding
to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201, 209 (1971). Numerous scholars have
joined Posner in using economics to analyze tort cases. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Saul Levmore,
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
3. The "notion of corrective justice" was first advanced by Aristotle. Catharine Pierce
Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2350 (1990). Its goal is to nullify gains and losses that arise between
individuals when one individual wrongfully injures another. Id. at 2350, 2355. In recent years
numerous scholars have emphasized a corrective justice rationale for tort law. See generally
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen ed. 1995); Symposium,
Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV.
403 (1992). Leading scholars subscribing to the justice rationale have advocated widely
divergent theories of how to define the concept of corrective justice. See Jules L. Coleman,
Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pts. I & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982), 2
LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983) (developing "foundational" principles that can be used to formulate
specific rules for resolving cases); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973) (advocating causation of harm as the basis for corrective justice);
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-56 (1972)
(advocating reciprocity of risk as the basis for corrective justice); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward
a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 43 (1983) (using Kantian principles
to give meaning to the notion of corrective justice); Wells, supra at 2353 (rejecting the idea
that abstract principles of justice can lead to workable tort rules and advocating that tort law
should strive to enforce community standards of just compensation by using procedures that
encourage juries to do justice in individual cases).
4. The rationales often coincide with respect to other tort issues as well. See generally
Schwartz, supra note 2 (discussing both deterrence and corrective justice as theories of tort liability).
[Vol. 66:11271128
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priorities of the tort system.
Courts generally use the "but for" test to determine what harm was caused
by an injury. Under this test, a tortfeasor's conduct is deemed to be the cause
of a particular result if that result would not have occurred in the absence of the
conduct. This "but for" test works well in many cases. For example, ifXlights
a fire that burns the plaintiff's building, Xcaused the harm (loss of value of the
building) because the building would not have lost its value absent the fire.
Multiple sufficient cause cases are closely analogous to duplicated harm
cases; thus, they provide a useful frame of reference for the discussion of
duplicated harm. Multiple sufficient cause cases deal with duplicated causes
of injury (invasion of a legally protected interest), while duplicated harm cases
deal with duplicated causes of a particular harm (loss or detriment).5 In
multiple sufficient cause cases, the "but for" test cannot identify which event
caused an injury because each of the multiple forces alone was sufficient to
cause the injury. Consider the following example:
Xnegligently lights a fire that merges with another fire, and the merged fire
completely bums plaintiff's building. Each fire alone would have been
sufficient to bum the building.
Under the "but for" test, X's fire did not cause the building to burn; even in the
absence ofX's fire, the other fire would have burned the building. For the same
reason, the other fire also is not a "but for" cause of the injury. These multiple
sufficient cause cases arise in a wide variety of factual contexts.6
In multiple sufficient cause cases, where both forces are tortious, all courts
impose liability on both tortfeasors without requiring "but for" causation.7
5. For the distinction between injury and harm, see supra note 1.
6. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir. 1969) (either of two
drugs may be sufficient to cause an illness); People v. Lewis, 57 P. 470, 471 (Cal. 1899)
(either of two wounds may be sufficient to cause death); Thomsen v. Rexall Drug & Chem.
Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (either of two drugs may be sufficient
to cause an illness); Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902) (noise from either of two
motorcycles may be sufficient to frighten a horse); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 789
P.2d 567, 575 (Mont. 1990) (either a breach of fiduciary obligation or a poor economy may be
sufficient to cause loss of business), overruled on other grounds by Busta v. Columbus Hosp.
Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 139 (Mont. 1996); Kyriss v. State, 707 P.2d 5, 8 (Mont. 1985) (either
defendant's malpractice or plaintiff's arteriosclerosis may be sufficient to cause gangrene);
Koenig v. Babka, 682 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (either of two acts of malpractice
may be sufficient to cause incontinence); Wilson v. State, 24 S.W. 409,410 (Tex. Crim. App.
1893) (either of two wounds may be sufficient to cause death); Geuder, Paeschke & Frey Co.
v. City of Milwaukee, 133 N.W. 835, 840 (Wis. 1911) (either natural flooding or a broken
sewer may be sufficient to flood a basement).
7. See, e.g, Koenig, 682 S.W.2d at 98; LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So.2d 471,475-77
(La. 1978); Corey, 65 N.E. at 69; cf Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 74
N.W. 561, 566 (Wis. 1898) (finding no liability where one fire is of innocent origin).
1999] 1129
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Courts do this to avoid the obvious injustice of allowing each culpable
tortfeasor to escape liability to an innocent victim by hiding behind the
negligence of the other tortfeasor' When one of the forces is innocent (non-
tortious), this fairness argument is weaker. Yet, many courts impose liability
on the sole tortfeasor when the other force is innocent.9 In lieu of "but for"
causation in multiple sufficient cause cases, these courts require thejury to find
that the tortfeasor's conduct was a"substantial factor" in producing the harm.'°
Cases involving successive causes that duplicate harm present problems
similar to those presented by multiple sufficient cause cases. Consider the
following hypothetical:
Example 1
Fire Xfrom the north and fire Yfrom the south approach plaintiff's building
for several days. Fire X arrives first and destroys the building. Fire Y
arrives one hour later, and would have destroyed the building at that time
had it not been destroyed previously by fire X."
Assume that Xnegligently started fire X, and that Ynegligently started fire Y.
This is not a case of multiple sufficient causes. Fire Xis clearly the "but for"
cause of the injury (the destruction ofthe building): but forX's negligence, the
building would not have burned. Hence, Xis liable. Yis not liable, because fire
Y did not destroy the building; there was no building to destroy when fire Y
arrived. However, this example presents a problem of duplicated harm, which
permits the argument that Xshould pay no significant damages to the building
owner. According to this argument, the building had no appreciable value at
the time it was destroyed by fire Xbecause fire Ywould have destroyed it one
hour later. A building doomed to bum in one hour has little or no value.
X's argument leads to thepatently unfair conclusion that neither tortfeasor
must pay any significant amount for the loss of the building. This result
appears inconsistent with the multiple sufficient cause cases. If each fire
reached the building at the same time, bothXand Ywould be liable for the full
value of the building. Therefore, by analogy to the multiple sufficient cause
cases, one or both tortfeasors could be held liable in the duplicated harm
situation for the full value of the building.
8. Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927).
9. See Basko, 416 F.2d at 429-30; Thomsen, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 647; Anderson v.
Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46 (Minn. 1920); Kitchen
Krafters, Inc., 789 P.2d at 575; Kyriss, 707 P.2d at 8-9; Geuder, Paeschke & Frey Co., 133
N.W. at 840; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965); 4 FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.3, at 116-17 (2d ed. 1986); Charles E. Carpenter,
Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 941, 945-46 (1935).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965).
11. This example is suggested in Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage,
47 HARV. L. REv. 1127, 1133 (1934).
[Vol. 66:1 1271130
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The difficulty with the argument in favor of liability for duplicated harm is
that virtually all tort cases involve duplicated harm of some kind. It is
especially common in the case of economic losses, such as loss of earning
capacity, loss of value of property, and harm necessitating expenditures for
such things as medical care and funerals. Duplicated harm also occurs with
non-economic losses such as pain, suffering, and mental distress. Often
defendants are not held liable for harm that plaintiffs would otherwise have
suffered. 2 In many instances, that is a sound result.
Consider the example ofa victim who is killed or permanently disabled by
a tortfeasor. A major portion of the harm is loss of earning capacity. We
measure this loss in accordance with our best estimate of the victim's remaining
earning capacity at the time of the tort. If the victim was suffering from a
terminal illness, the compensation awarded for lost earning capacity would
cover only the time between the tort and the time that the illness would likely
have prevented further employment.'3 Conversely, a healthy person's lost
earning capacity would be calculated by reference to mortality tables.'4 In both
situations, we exclude liability for harm that is duplicated by an anticipated
subsequent intervening event. This is analogous to the successive cause
hypothetical discussed above where fire Yis of innocent origin. In one case the
intervening cause (analogous to fire Y) was the terminal illness, while in the
other case it was an actuarially predicted death from unknown forces. In other
words, we routinely allow tortfeasors to take advantage of expected subsequent
events that are sufficient to duplicate the harm the tortfeasor caused.
Otherwise, the tortfeasor would be required to pay for loss of earning capacity
based on a life of infinite duration in every case.
Prior events or circumstances can also duplicate the harm that tortious conduct
would have produced. For example, if a tortfeasor disables a fast food worker
earning the minimum wage, he will pay smaller damages for loss of earning
capacity than if he injures a surgeon. Something caused the victim to be a low-
income worker before the tortfeasor injured her and further impaired her earning
capacity. Our system permits the tortfeasor to reduce his liability by taking
advantage of that prior cause. In other words, the tortfeasor is only liable for the
difference between what the plaintiff ean earn now and what the plaintiff could have
earned if the tortfeasor had not injured the plaintiff. Courts exempt the tortfeasor
from liability for the portion of the harm that his conduct was sufficient to produce,
but that was duplicated by prior forces. The duplicated harm in the fast food
worker example is the loss of ability to earn above the minimum wage. Denying
12. See infra notes 58, 145-52 and accompanying text.
13. See cases cited infra notes 37-40.
14. See, e.g., Acampora v. Ledewitz, 269 A.2d 288, 292 (Conn. 1970); McManus v.
Jarvis, 22 A.2d 857, 860 (Conn. 1939) ("Where a plaintiff claims damages for future loss in
capacity to earn, the probable duration of his life is an important element in determining the
amount to be awarded, and resort to mortality tables is the accepted method of supplying this
information."); cf., e.g., Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1992).
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the tortfeasor the right to take advantage of prior causes would require each tort
victim to be compensated at an infinitely high level.
To hold tortfeasors liable for duplicated harm in every instance would be
clearly impractical, unworkable, and would lead to absurd results. However,
to insulate tortfeasors systematically from liability for duplicated harm would
also produce unfair results in some cases. The task is to craft a reasoned
approach for deciding when to hold tortfeasors liable for duplicated harm and
when to exonerate them.
This article analyzes duplicated harm cases from the United States and
other common-law countries and suggests approaches for deciding when
tortfeasors should be liable for duplicated harm. Part II discusses the role that
causation plays in valuing damages and how that role relates to the policy of
achieving corrective justice. Part III creates two categories for classifying
duplicated harm cases. It discusses how courts have decided cases in each
category and analyzes each category in terms of the twin tort policies of
achieving efficiency and corrective justice. Part IV addresses how courts deal
with tortious conduct that benefits plaintiffs. Part V analyzes the conflict
between efficiency and corrective justice in valuing damages for lost earning
capacity and the concomitant implications for the positive economic theory of
tort law. Part VI examines the implications that duplicated harm cases have on
the way in which courts should decide multiple sufficient cause cases when one
of the causes is innocent.
II. CAUSATION AND DAMAGE VALUATION
In tort cases, courts often treat proof of causation of harm and proof of the
amount of damages necessary to compensate for the harm as separate questions
that involve different standards of proof.'" Personal injury cases involving
permanent disability illustrate the desirability of this approach. In such cases,
a major type of harm is the loss of future earning capacity. Under the two-step
process, the plaintiff must first prove that the defendant caused the harm (loss
of earning capacity) by permanently disabling her, and then she must value the
harm (calculate damages) by showing how much she would have earned for the
rest of her life if she had not been disabled.
Courts could treat this as a single question that the plaintiff must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence, under which the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant caused a loss of earning capacity of a clearly established amount
by causing the permanent disability. The difficulty with this one-step approach
15. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1353-55,
1373-76 (1981 ) (arguing that causation and valuation are distinct concepts that must be dealt
with separately); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1798-
1801 (1985) (discussing the distinction between causal and damages issues in the context of
overwhelming-force cases).
1132 [Vol. 66:1127
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is that it is often impossible for the plaintiff to prove with any degree of
certainty the exact amount of lost earning capacity. This is particularly true if
the plaintiff is a young person who has not yet established a career at the time
of the injury. Rather than deny recovery in such cases by applying the usual
standard of proof, courts often permit recovery by adopting the two-step
approach and relaxing the standard of proof with respect to proof of lost
earning capacity. That is, the plaintiff must first prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant caused a loss of earning capacity by
permanently disabling her. 6 Second, the plaintiff must value the loss by
introducing as much evidence as is reasonably available under the
circumstances and permitting the jury to determine the best possible estimate
of the plaintiff's loss.' 7
Use of this two-step process results in a double-dose of "but for" causa-
tion. First, most courts use the "but for" test to determine whether the defen-
dant caused harm."8 Second, they value the harm by using what is the
equivalent of the "but for" test 9 because damages are designed to restore the
plaintiff to the position she would have been in had the defendant not
tortiously caused the harm.2' Therefore, in valuing the harm, courts do not
consider losses resulting from other (particularly non-tortious) causes.2'
Thus, if a preexisting condition reduced the plaintiffs earning capacity
before the defendant tortiously injured the plaintiff, further impairing the
plaintiffs earning capacity, the defendant is liable only for the difference
between what the plaintiff can now earn and what she would have earned if
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. a at 479 (1979).
17. Id. § 912 at 478 (requiring "as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the
circumstances permit").
18. E.g., Follett v. Jones, 481 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ark. 1972).
19. See Thompson v. Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd., [1984] 1 All E.R. 881,
905 (Q.B. 1983) ("The starting point for any inquiry into the measure of damages is the
principle that the court should so far as possible endeavour to restore the plaintiff to the
position in which he would have found himself but for the defendant's wrongful act.")
(Emphasis added); see also Anthes v. Anthes, 139 N.W.2d 201, 208 (Iowa 1965) ("The right
to damages for impairment of earning capacity may otherwise be classified as impairment of
ability to work and earn. It is determinable by the difference between the value of an
individual's services.., but for the injury, and the value of the services of an injured person
... in the future.") (emphasis added).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f at 512 (1979) ("The general
principle underlying the assessment of damages in tort cases.., is that an injured person is
entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the position he would have occupied had it not
been for the . . . tort."); see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) ("A
plaintiff's remedy in tort is compensatory in nature and damages are generally intended not
to punish a negligent defendant but to restore an injured person as nearly as possible to the
position he or she would have been in had the wrong not been done.").
21. Wright, supra note 15, at 1798: see JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL, THE TORTS
PROCESS 112 (4th ed. 1994) ("[T]he concept of actual cause.., helps to fix the size of the
recoveries .... ); King, supra note 15, at 1359-63 (advocating damage assessments reflecting
the presence of preexisting conditions).
1999] 1133
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the defendant had not injured her. This method of valuing damages gives the
tortfeasor the benefit of all duplicative causes by limiting the tortfeasor's
liability to damages that would have occurred only as a result of that
tortfeasor' s conduct.
Courts use the "but for" test to value damages not as a mere quirk or
oversight, but because it implements basic notions of corrective justice.
Compensation for injury caused by tortious conduct is the "cardinal principle
of damages in Anglo-American law. '22 The "first purpose of tort law"23 is to
restore the plaintiff to the position he would have been in "but for" the
defendant's misconduct. This objective is inherent in the tort concept of
compensation because it is a "natural ... corollary of the fault principle., 24 To
implement this policy, courts value damages by comparing the plaintiff's
situation caused by the tortious conduct to the situation the plaintiff would have
been in if the tortious conduct had not occurred. In fact, courts deny most
recovery in "wrongful life" cases because of the impossibility of calculating
damages in the above manner.25 In such cases, there is simply no way to
compare the plaintiff's present circumstances with those that would have
prevailed if the tort had not occurred.26
This Article is concerned with the consequences of using the "but for" test
to value damages. The crucial point in this Part is that courts use the "but for"
test to limit recovery because it furthers the corrective justice policy of restoring
the victim to the position she would have occupied if the tort had not occurred.
III. EVENTS THAT DUPLICATE HARM
This Part analyzes duplicated harm cases with an emphasis on whether the
policies of efficiency and corrective justice are furthered by imposing liability
22. 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 9, § 25.1, at 490.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a at 452 (1979).
24. 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 9, § 25.1, at 494.
25. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964.
26. For example, the California Supreme Court stated in Turpin:
Furthermore, the practical problems are exacerbated when it comes to the matter of arriving
at an appropriate award of damages. As already discussed, in fixing damages in a tort case the
jury generally compares the condition plaintiff would have been in but for the tort, with the
position the plaintiff is in now, compensating the plaintiff for what has been lost as a result of
the wrong. Although the valuation of pain- and suffering or emotional distress in terms of
dollars and cents is unquestionably difficult in an ordinary personal injury action, jurors at least
have some frame of reference in their own general experience to appreciate what the plaintiff
has lost-normal life without pain and suffering. In a wrongful life action, that simply is not
the case, for what the plaintiff has "lost" is not life without pain and suffering but rather the
unknowable status of never having been bom. In this context, a rational, nonspeculative
determination of a specific monetary award in accordance with normal tort principles appears
to be outside the realm of human competence.
Id. at 964.
1134 [Vol. 66:1127
HeinOnline  -- 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1134 1998-1999
DUPLICATED HARM
for duplicated harm. Duplicated harm cases fall into two categories, each of
which has three variations. The first category involves one cause that is actual
and one that is potential. The second category involves two successive causes
that each produce an actual accident or illness under circumstances where some
or all of the harm is duplicated.
A. One Force Produces an Actual Accident or Illness and Another Force
Threatens a Potential Accident or Illness that Duplicates Harm
This section analyzes cases in which one cause is actual and the other cause
is potential. In these cases, one force first produces an actual accident or
illness. Then, a second force threatens a potential accident or illness that would
have duplicated some or all of the harm produced by the first force if the first
force had not preceded it. Example 1, set out above27 and repeated here for
convenience, illustrates the types of cases under consideration:
Example 1
Fire Xfrom the north and fire Yfrom the south approach plaintiff's building
for several days. Fire X arrives first and destroys the building. Fire Y
arrives one hour later, and would have destroyed the building at that time
had it not been destroyed previously by fire X.
Three variations of this hypothetical illustrate the full range of cases in this
section: (1) fireXis tortious (was caused by a wrongdoer) and fire Yis innocent
(Type A-1); (2) fire Xand fire Yare both tortious (Type A-2); and (3) fire Xis
innocent while fire Y is tortious (Type A-3). We will consider each of these
variations in turn. The following table summarizes the results of this analysis:
Table A
Type A-1 Type A-2 Type A-3
Actual (tortious) Actual (tortious) Actual (innocent)
Potential Potential Potential
(innocent) (tortious) (tortious)
Liability for No No cases No
duplicated harm?
Deterrence No Actual: Yes No
requires liability? Potential: No
Fairness requires No Actual: Yes No
liability? Potential: Yes
27. See supra text accompanying note 1I.
1999] 1135
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1. Actual Force Is Tortious and Potential Force Is Innocent
(Type A-I Cases)
Type A- I cases are those in which fireX(started byX) is oftortious origin and
fire Y is of non-tortious origin. This variation includes all cases in which a
tortfeasor causes harm under circumstances such that, if the tortfeasor had not
acted, a subsequent non-tortious event would have duplicated all or part of that
harm. Under these circumstances, courts generally exonerate the initial tortfeasor
from liability for all the harm that would have been duplicated by the potential
subsequent event that never actually took place.28 However, it must be sufficiently
clear that the subsequent event would have occurred. This rule is important
because it reflects the common-law approach to damage assessment discussed
previously.29 These subsequent non-tortious events fall into two categories: harm
duplicated by future forces and harm duplicated by preexisting forces. Prior to
discussing the Type A- I cases in detail, the Article will consider the application of
the tort policies of efficiency and corrective justice.
a. Efficiency and Fairness
The general approach of exonerating tortfeasors for duplicated harm in
these cases is appropriate because it usually furthers the twin policies of
fairness and efficiency. From a fairness perspective, imposing liability for harm
duplicated by non-tortious forces is undesirable because it would give the
plaintiff a windfall. Corrective justice requires no more than that the plaintiff
be restored to the position that he would have occupied if the tort had not
occurred.
From an efficiency perspective, liability for duplicated harm is also
undesirable. Economic analysis suggests that imposing liability for harm
duplicated by non-tortious forces can produce inefficient results in one of two
ways. First, the administrative costs associated with litigating claims for
duplicated harm constitute economic waste because they will not reduce the
level of accidents. No tortfeasor can prevent the harm because it is duplicated
by separate non-tortious forces. Second, either the increased scope of liability
or the increased administrative costs associated with the additional increment
of liability can cause overdeterrence by inducing actors to take a course of
action that does not optimize social welfare. Holding the tortfeasor liable only
for the harm that would not have occurred had he not been negligent is
sufficient to give the tortfeasor the proper incentive to take due care.3"
28. See infra notes 32-60 and accompanying text.
29. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
30. These economic effects have been analyzed exhaustively elsewhere, and the analysis
will not be repeated here. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 234-42 (1987); David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission
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The policies of efficiency and fairness are in conflict, however, with respect to
one issue relating to the manner in which courts implement the rule against
imposing liability for duplicated harm. The Type A-I cases, discussed below,
demonstrate that in calculating life expectancy for purposes of determining lost
earning capacity, courts tend to use the most specific and individualized evidence
available rather than rely exclusively on pure averages derived from mortality
tables. Use of specific evidence promotes corrective justice by making it possible
to restore the plaintiff to her actual prior position. However, optimal deterrence
requires the use of average life expectancy rather than the victim's actual life
expectancy calculated in light of specific potential illnesses and injuries.3
b. Harm Duplicated by Future Forces
A common and important example of the exoneration of tortfeasors from
liability for duplicated harm is a case involving death or long term disability in
which the plaintiff seeks recovery for future lost earning capacity. Courts do
not compensate the plaintiff for the amount that she could have earned (or in a
wrongful death case, the amount that the plaintiff's decedent would have
earned) in a life of infinite duration.32 Rather, the trier of fact must estimate
what the victim's working life would have been "but for" the injury and
compensate only for the amount by which the accident reduced that capacity.33
The standard mortality tables provide the starting point for this analysis.34
These tables calculate life expectancy by considering both natural and non-
natural causes of death.35 However, the tables are not conclusive.36 The
tortfeasor may introduce evidence indicating that the victim would have had a
shorter-than-average working life due to a life threatening disease37 such as
Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1335, 1364-80; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 111-23 (1983);
Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980).
31. The reasons for this are set out in detail in Part V of this Article and are not repeated
here.
32. E.g., Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1502 (10th Cir. 1992).
33. E.g., Michels v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 1244,1258 (S.D. Iowa 1993); see Mark
A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to
Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 884 (1996).
34. Rothstein, supra note 33, at 884-87. Some courts use "work life expectancy" tables
instead of mortality tables. See Thibodeaux v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 647 So. 2d 351, 361 (La.
Ct. App. 1994); Ewing v. Esterholt, 684 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Mont. 1984).
35. See generally R.N. Anderson et al., Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1995,
MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. (National Ctr. for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, Md.), No. 11,
Supp. 2, June 12, 1997.
36. Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 203 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1964).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. e at 526 (1979).
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heart disease, 38 HIV, 39 or cancer.4 ° Some courts also admit evidence that the
victim had an unusually hazardous occupation4' or had bad personal habits,
such as the use of alcohol,42 tobacco,4 3 or drugs," that would have shortened
her working life. The plaintiffmay likewise introduce evidence that the victim
would likely have had a longer-than-average working life because of unusually
good health4" or because of an unusually safe occupation.' Since loss of
earning capacity cases arise quite often, the rule exempting a tortfeasor from
liability for all harm that would have been duplicated by other causes, both
tortious and non-tortious, has significant impact.
In the above cases, death predicted by mortality tables is a future force that
is the equivalent of a non-tortious fire Ythat had not come into being until after
tortious fire X destroyed the building. Evidence of a future death, predicted
because of an existing disease, is a preexisting force that is the equivalent of a
fire Y that was burning before the destruction of the building by fire X.
Preexisting forces duplicating harm are discussed in more detail in Part
III.A. 1 .c.4
7
Another line of cases involves future disability or death of a person too
young to have an established career. To estimate loss of future earning
capacity, courts must predict the degree to which non-tortious future forces
would have reduced the victim's capacity to earn money. Courts then hold the
tortfeasor liable for the amount the victim could have earned in the absence of
the tort rather than for an infinite amount of lost earnings. To estimate future
limits on earning capacity, courts have considered personal factors such as
intelligence and skill 4 as well as societal factors such as the tendency of
females to earn less than males. 49 Therefore, the tortfeasor is exempt from
38. See Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. 1978).
39. See Agosto v. Trusswal Sys. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
40. See Follett v. Jones, 481 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Ark. 1972); City of Tampa v. Johnson,
114 So. 2d 807, 809-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
41. E.g., Jones v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 78 So. 568, 570 (La. 1918); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. e at 526 (1979).
42. See Smith v. Southland Corp., 738 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
43. See Wehmeier v. UNR Indus., Inc., 572 N.E.2d 320, 339-40 (III. App. Ct. 1991).
44. See Ward v. Loomis Bros., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 807, 810-11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
45. See Ewing v. Esterholt, 684 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Mont. 1984); Escobar v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 813,815 (Sup. Ct. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 573 N.Y.S.2d 498
(App. Div. 1991).
46. See, e.g., Caudle v. Southern Ry. Co., 88 S.E.2d 138 (N.C. 1955); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. e at 526 (1979).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 61-81.
48. See Martin v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 6, 8-9, 11-12 (D. Ariz. 1979) (allowing
testimony regarding a child's intelligence level as a factor in the loss of earning capacity
determination); Foskey v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1047, 1062 (D.R.I. 1979) (discussing
the employability of a mentally retarded child in the context of earning capacity).
49. Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.I. 1975), aft'd, 548 F.2d 366
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compensating the victim for the loss of earning capacity caused by the tort if it
can be expected that personal and societal factors will duplicate that loss.
In both the cases predicting a future time of death and the cases predicting
future forces that reduce earning capacity, courts often use speculative
evidence.50 Because the future loss in question is inevitable, it makes sense for
courts to limit liability using imprecise evidence when more precise evidence is
unavailable. After all, death ends every life and no one has an absolutely
unlimited capacity to earn money. One alternative to using imprecise evidence
is to use no evidence at all and hold the defendant liable for infinite damages.
This result would be inconsistent with both the policy of achieving corrective
justice and the policy of achieving efficiency. Another alternative to using
imprecise evidence is to award every plaintiff an average damage amount
without regard to the circumstances of the case. Although this alternative is not
as offensive to the efficiency goal, it would thwart the goal of placing plaintiffs
in their previous position.
According to the goal of corrective justice, courts should not exonerate
tortfeasors from liability for potentially duplicated harm if it leads to
undercompensation. For example, in Illinois, a decedent's estate can maintain
a cause of action for the decedent's medical, hospital, and funeral expenses
arising out of a fatal accident,"j but not for the income that the decedent would
have accumulated had he not been prematurely killed.52 The defendant in such
a case could argue, by analogy to the lost earning capacity cases, that she is not
liable for the funeral expenses. If the decedent had not been fatally injured, he
would have incurred similar funeral expenses upon his eventual death.
Predicting future funeral expenses is no more speculative than predicting a
future time of death. Yet, Illinois courts allow recovery for funeral expenses
even though they would have been duplicated by future events if the decedent
had lived. This rule is correct because offsetting present funeral expenses with
(1 st Cir. 1976). Some scholars argue that distinctions based on race and sex are inappropriate
because they tend to perpetuate discrimination. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use
of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional
Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 75 (1994); Sherri R. Lamb, Comment, Toward Gender-
Neutral Data for Adjudicating Lost Future Earnings Damages: An Evidentiary Perspective,
72 CHI-KENT L. REv. 299, 303 (1996); see also Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167
(1st Cir. 1988) (noting that women today do not necessarily remove themselves from the
workforce while raising children).
50. See cases cited supra notes 33-46, 48-49.
51. Harrison v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 750 F. Supp. 316, 320-21 (N.D. III. 1990);
Chidester v. Cagwin, 222 N.E.2d 274, 276 (III. App. Ct. 1966).
52. Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, the decedent's survivors do have a cause of
action for the losses they suffer because of the decedent's death. The measure of damages is
not, however, the amount that the decedent would have accumulated had he lived. Rather, the
measure is the pecuniary value that the decedent would have contributed to the survivors had
the decedent lived. 740 I11. Comp. Stat. 180/1- /2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); Elliott v. Willis,
442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
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hypothetical future expenses would lead to undercompensation.
Typically, undercompensation results because the decedent would have had
sufficient future income to offset his future expenses if he had lived a normal
life span. The estate's cause of action in Illinois does not include any form of
compensation for loss of the decedent's future income.5 3 Thus, the estate would
be in a worse position if it had to absorb premature expenses caused by the
defendant than it would be in if those expenses had been paid from the
decedent's earnings throughout the course of a normal life.
Other states follow a contrasting rule. For example, Iowa gives the
decedent's estate a survival action against the tortfeasor that does allow
compensation for the loss of decedent's future income. 4 The estate is entitled
to compensation for all losses to the estate caused by the death." This includes
medical and hospital expenses as well as the amount of money that the decedent
would have accumulated (reduced to present worth) if the decedent had not been
killed prematurely. 56 In calculating the amount of income that would have been
accumulated, expenses are deducted from the decedent's expected income.57
Therefore, the estate is not entitled to compensation for funeral expenses
because this is an expense that the estate would have incurred anyway.5
However, the estate is entitled to "interest on the amount representing the
reasonable cost of the funeral for the period between the date of the death of the
decedent and the end of his normal period of expectancy."59 This is necessary
to compensate the estate for paying the funeral expenses early. Under the Iowa
approach, it is appropriate to deny recovery for the duplicated funeral expenses
because the estate is no worse off than it would have been if the decedent had
lived a normal life span.'
c. Harm Duplicated by Preexisting Forces
Courts also exonerate tortfeasors from liability for future duplicated harm
that is threatened by a force already in operation before the injury. They do so,
however, only if the potential future harm can be proved with reasonable
precision.6' In such cases courts apply the "thin skull" rule, which provides
53. See Chidester, 222 N.E.2d at 276.
54. See Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22,48-49 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Lang v. City
of Des-Moines, 294 N.W.2d 557, 562-63 (Iowa 1980).
55. See Van Wie, 77 F. Supp. at 48.
56. Id. at 48-49; Lang, 294 N.W.2d at 562-63.
57. Van Wie, 77 F. Supp. at 48.
58. Id. at 49.
59. Id.
60. But see Sinclair Ref. Co: v. Butler, 190 So. 2d 313, 319 (Fla. 1965) (awarding
decedent's estate compensation for funeral expenses).
61. E.g., Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he burden of
proof in such cases is upon the defendant to prove the extent of the damages that the
preexisting condition would inevitably have caused."); Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d
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that "[t]he defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him."62 If the plaintiff
suffers more harm than a normal person would because of an unusual
susceptibility or characteristic, the defendant is liable for the increased harm.6 3
A corollary to the "thin skull" rule comes into play when the defendant can
show that the plaintiffwould eventually have suffered the same harm due to his
unusual susceptibility.' Under these circumstances, the defendant is only liable
for the harm caused during the period of time between the occurrence of the
injury and the time it would have occurred anyway.65 Thus, if a motorist
negligently injures a pedestrian who is an alcoholic and the injury precipitates
delirium tremens that causes death, the defendant is liable for the death even
though a normal person would not have died as a result of the accident."
However, the defendant may mitigate damages by showing that, if the accident
had not occurred, the delirium tremens would probably have caused a
premature death.67
The following examples illustrate the breadth of this rule. If the plaintiff,
extraordinarily predisposed to mental illness, suffers a mental illness caused by
the defendant's actions, then the defendant is liable for causing the illness.6"
However, the defendant may reduce her damages by showing that if the accident
had not occurred, some later event would probably have caused the same mental
illness.69 If an injury to a woman in the eighth month of her pregnancy causes
premature birth, plaintiff can recover for the increased costs of giving birth to
a premature child; however, she cannot recover for the medical expenses that
would have been incurred had she given birth normally. 7° Courts have al~o
exempted tortfeasors from having to pay for duplicated harm in non-economic
cases. For example, a plaintiff with back disease who is injured by the
defendant can claim damages for the increased pain and suffering caused by the
defendant, but the defendant is not liable for the pain the disease eventually
would have caused if the injury had not occurred.7'
502, 504 (5th Cir. 1964) ("The trier[] of fact[] must... determine whether or not the pre-
existing condition [is] bound to worsen, in which event an appropriate discount should be
made for the damages that would have been suffered even in the absence of the defendant's
negligence.").




66. McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616, 617 (N.Y. 1911).
67. Id.
68. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1970) (schizophrenia).
69. Id. at 1173.
70. Powers v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 792, 794-95 (N.M. 1968).
71. Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 973 (7th Cir. 1983); see
Kegel v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 790, 795-96 (D. Mont. 1968) (suggesting a discount for
back pain that would have been suffered absent the tort); Hudgins v. Serrano, 453 A.2d 218,
222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (placing the burden of apportioning damages on the
1999] 1141
HeinOnline  -- 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1141 1998-1999
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Courts also exonerate the tortfeasor from liability for duplicated harm when
a preexisting force will produce a future accident. The classic case is Dillon
v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.72 In Dillon, a young boy playing on the
superstructure of a bridge lost his balance and was electrocuted when he
grabbed a high voltage wire maintained by the defendant.73 In a wrongfiul death
action against the defendant for failing to take precautions against accidental
electrocution, the court held that the jury must decide what would have
happened to the boy if the wire had not been charged with electricity. 74 If the
jury decided that the boy would have regained his balance, it should award
damages for loss of earning capacity for a life of normal duration.75 However,
if the jury felt the boy would have been seriously injured, it should award
damages for his capacity to earn in that injured condition.76 If the jury
determined that he would have been killed, it should award no damages for lost
earning capacity.77
Other less well-known cases apply this same principle. For instance, if a
tortfeasor negligently blocks a waterway and prevents a dredge from moving
downstream, the tortfeasor is not liable for loss of earnings caused by the delay if
the dredge would have been delayed to the same extent because high water further
downstream caused a drawbridge to be impassible.78 Similarly, a tortfeasor who
negligently leaves a rail six to eight feet from a riverbank is not a "substantial factor
in producing the harm" when a boater is killed by running into the rail in the dark
while heading toward the bank at full speed.79 If the rail had not been there, the
boat would have hit the bank and the boater would have been killed at a slightly
later time. ° A tortfeasor who negligently kills fish by pumping cold water into a
stream is not liable for the harm caused by the loss of the fish if unusually cold
weather conditions would have killed the fish at a later time.8
It is difficult to determine when to apply the rule exonerating the tortfeasor
from having to pay damages for harm that would have been duplicated by a
preexisting potential cause. Several scholars advocate that the tortfeasor's
liability should be reduced only if the potential cause has "reduced the value
of the interest the defendant destroyed."' 2 Professor Joseph King's version of
defendant).
72. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 163 A. 111 (1932).
73. Id. atll2.




78. Douglas, Burt & Buchanan Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 91 So. 503, 504 (La. 1922).
79. Utzinger v. United States, 432 F.2d 485,489 (6th Cir. 1970).
80. Id.
81. Department of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337,
342 (N.J. 1976).
82. King, supra note 15, at 1360; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 353 (5th ed. 1984); Peaslee, supra note 11, at 1134.
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this rule provides that the potential cause does not reduce the tortfeasor's
liability unless it becomes "attached before the defendant's conduct has reached
a similar stage."83 A cause becomes attached when it is so associated with the
value of the plaintiff's interest that the potential harm could not be avoided even
if the plaintiff knew about it." This is a mechanical rule based on ease of
application. Professor King argues that a rule that would give the tortfeasor the
benefit of innocent causes that had not attached (i.e., "events contingent at the
time of the injury") would produce "absurd results" and could not be
administered.8" Under Professor King's proposed rule, Dillon v. Twin State
Gas & Electric Co. was properly decided.86 The potential cause of death (the
fall) had "attached" because the decedent was in the process of falling at the
time he was negligently electrocuted.8" However, suppose that the defendant
negligently killed a person who was scheduled to depart on a steamer in one
hour.88 The steamer subsequently sank because it hit an iceberg, and all
persons on board were lost at sea.89 Professor King asserts that the defendant
should be liable for full damages without mitigation for a preexisting condition
because the iceberg was a potential cause of harm that had not "attached." 90
Professor King's proposed rule successfully captures the sentiment
expressed by many courts against reducing a tortfeasor's liability on the basis
of speculative evidence that another potential cause would have duplicated some
of the plaintiffs harm. 91 Yet a bright line rule can seldom either explain all
cases or resolve all cases in a desirable way. Professor King's proposed rule
is no exception. Under a rigid application of this rule, evidence of a tort
victim's bad habits, such as smoking, drinking, and drug use, should not be
admissible to show a shortened life expectancy unless they have "attached" by
developing into incurable diseases and conditions affecting the victim's life
expectancy. At any stage before such a disease or condition becomes
inevitable, the bad habits have not "attached" because the victim could change
her conduct and expect to live a normal life. Reasoning by analogy, the
83. King, supra note 15, at 1357.
84. Id. at 1357-60. Peaslee proposed a similar rule, arguing that the innocent potential
cause should not relieve the tortfeasor of liability for duplicated harm unless it was a known
force in active operation when the tortfeasor's act became operative. Peaslee, supra note 11,
at 1130. The authors of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts agree with Peaslee's
formulation of the rule. KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 52, at 353 (stating that another force
should reduce value only if"in operation when the defendant causes harm, and so imminent
that reasonable persons would take them into account").
85. King, supra note 15, at 1358.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1357-58.
88. Id. at 1358.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1357-60; see also Peaslee, supra note 11, at 1139-41 (agreeing with this
result).
91. See, e.g., Powers v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 792 (N.M. 1968).
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evidence of the victim's unusually good health should not be admissible to show
that the victim would have lived longer than predicted by the mortality tables
because good health likewise cannot "attach." It is always in the victim's
power to develop bad habits that would destroy her health and shorten her life.
Yet, courts use evidence both of victims' good health and of their bad habits.
This evidence helps courts predict the victim's life expectancy more precisely
than they could by relying on mortality tables alone, thereby reducing the
speculative nature of awards.
In addition to the policy against speculation, other factors may play a role
in determining when a defendant can take advantage of other causes that
duplicate harm. Cases in which a defendant negligently causes a plaintiff to
suffer a miscarriage illustrate this point. Contrary to the usual rule, many
courts do not permit defendants to deduct the pain and suffering that a plaintiff
would have experienced in normal childbirth from the pain and suffering caused
by the miscarriage. 92 A possible explanation for these cases is that evidence of
future pain is "too remote, speculative, and uncertain to be taken as a basis for
estimating damages." '93 If this is true, the policy against speculative damages
explains these cases. Yet, the pregnancy would appear to be a potential cause
of future pain that had "attached" under Professor King's rule. At least after
it was too late to obtain an abortion, the plaintiff lacked the power to avoid the
future pain caused by the pregnancy and the birth of the child. The future pain
from pregnancy hardly seems more speculative than the future back pain that
was used to offset present back pain in the Powers case discussed previously. 94
Therefore, the view that the future pain of normal childbirth is too "speculative"
to consider in assessing damages for a miscarriage may not be consistent with
the bulk of the cases allowing defendants to escape liability for duplicated harm.
Another explanation for the miscarriage cases is that our sense of justice
is less offended when a defendant is exonerated for potentially duplicated
economic losses as opposed to potentially duplicated pain and suffering. Such
an explanation is suggested by the court in Big Sandy & Cumberland Railroad
Co. v. Blankenship.95 It declined to permit the defendant to reduce his damages
by the amount of future pain and illness because the defendant wronged the
plaintiff by causing her to suffer "at a time when she otherwise would not have
92. See Morris v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 117 N.W. 500, 502 (Minn. 1908); Plonty v.
Murphy, 84 N.W. 1005, 1006-07 (Minn. 1901); Occhipinti v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 172 So. 2d
186, 190 (Miss. 1965); seealso Big Sandy & Cumberland R.R. Co. v. Blankenship, 118 S.W.
316,317-18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909); Grafv. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140, 146 (N.J. 1964); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906 (N.Y. 1969); Raynor v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 126 P. 91,
93 (Wash. 1912). But see Nevala v. City of Ironwood, 205 N.W. 93, 94 (Mich. 1925);
Hawkins v. Front-Street Cable Ry. Co., 28 P. 1021, 1024 (Wash. 1892).
93. Morris, 117 N.W. at 502.
94. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
95. 118 S.W. 316 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909).
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to suffer."96 Likewise, Hart and Honor6 are less enthusiastic about offsetting
damages for present pain based on evidence of potential future pain than they
are about offsetting damages for present economic loss with evidence that the
loss would have occurred in the future.97
While Professor King's proposed rule promotes the policy against awarding
speculative damages, the preceding discussion shows that in some
circumstances it may reach results that violate our sense ofjustice. Sometimes
other policies outweigh the interest promoted by the rule. Applying Professor
King's rule to Example 198 further illustrates this point. According to the rule,
the first fire to become so large that the plaintiff could do nothing to avoid its
effects is the fire that "attaches." Xwould pay no damages if fire Y attaches,
but would pay all of the plaintiff's damages if fire Xattaches. This latter result
is inconsistent with the tort policy of putting the plaintiff in the position she
would have occupied if the tort had not occurred. The plaintiff gets a windfall
in the latter instance because if fire Xhad not burned her building, fire Ysurely
would have. Furthermore, denying the plaintiff s recovery would not be unduly
speculative under the particular facts of this hypothetical. Fire Ymay not have
attached, but we know, in hindsight, that fire Y would have destroyed the
building if fire Xhad not. This example raises the question of whether any
important policy (other than ease of application) is served by deciding the case
on the basis of which of the fires was the first to attach.
The attachment requirement is based on the idea that the first force to
attach reduces the value of the protected interest. Thus, the second force is
preempted by the first and has no causal significance. 99 For example, Professor
King's rule would hold Xliable for the full value of the building if fire Xis the
first to attach because fire Ycaused no prior reduction in the building's value.
In the rare case where both fires are of equal size and equal distance from the
building, they may attach at the same time. This would result in a case of
"multiple sufficient causes" because each is sufficient to cause the harm (loss
of value) at the same instant.' " Under these circumstances, Xwould be liable
for the full value of the building because fire X is a "substantial factor" in
causing the harm.'
Accordingly, the attachment rule may resolve the first variation of Example
I (a Type A-I case) improperly. The result it produces is not mandated by
causal principles and may not always represent good policy. A court is free to
exonerate X from liability for harm X caused if this is desirable. Giving the
96. Id. at 317-18; see Plonty, 84 N.W. at 1007 (declining to reduce damages by the
amount of future pain on the grounds that computing damages in that way is "unreasonable"
and is not "sensible" or "just").
97. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, 251 (2d ed. 1985).
98. See supra text accompanying note 11.
99. See Wright, supra note 15, at 1795-98.
100. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
1999) 1145
HeinOnline  -- 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1145 1998-1999
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
defendant the benefit of forces that potentially duplicate harm, even when those
forces have not caused a prior reduction in value, furthers the policy of
restoring the plaintiffto the position she would have occupied if the tort hadnot
occurred. 2 Because the second force that duplicated the harm (fire Y) is
innocent, fairness does not justify setting aside the normal rule exempting
tortfeasors from having to pay for duplicated harm. In fact, in several
situations where-according to this view of causation-the defendant caused
the entire loss, courts reduce the defendant's liability on the basis of subsequent
innocent forces that have not yet caused a loss of value. One category of such
cases allows a reduction in recovery for lost earnings on the basis of mortality
tables and evidence of the victim's unhealthy habits.0 3 In another category of
cases, a tortfeasor causes a disability in an accident that is duplicated by a
subsequent non-tortious illness or accident. '" In those cases, courts generally
exonerate the tortfeasor from having to pay for the duplicated harm even though
the subsequent event did not cause the loss because the loss occurred prior to
the second event.' 5
This policy analysis suggests that X's liability for the value of the building
in the first variation of Example 1 (Type A-I cases) should not be contingent
on which fire "attached" first. Rather, liability should depend on the quality of
proof regarding whether fire Ywould inevitably have destroyed the building.
If X can prove this with sufficient clarity, X should escape liability for the
duplicated harm. Considerations of efficiency and fairness do not compel a
contrary result.
Thus, causation of a prior reduction in value is a poor proxy for reliable
proof that the harm would have been duplicated. It unnecessarily permits
recovery for duplicated harm in some cases where policy dictates that recovery
be denied. Requiring the defendant to prove that the harm would have been
duplicated by another force yields more consistently appropriate results than
requiring the defendant to prove that the other force caused a prior reduction in
value of the interest the defendant destroyed.
2. Both Forces Are Tortious (Type A-2 Cases)
The second variation of Example I is the case in which both fire X(caused
by X) and fire Y (caused by 1) are of tortious origin. There appear to be no
cases that directly resolve the question of liability in this situation. 0 6 Law
professors frequently illustrate this problem with a hypothetical similar to
Example 2:107
102. Wright, supra note 15, at 1798.
103. See sources cited supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 142-55.
105. See cases cited infra notes 143-54.
106. KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 52, at 354.
107. See id. § 52, at 353-54.
1146 [Vol. 66:1127
HeinOnline  -- 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1146 1998-1999
DUPLICATED HARM
Example 2
Y gives the victim a fatal poison and X shoots and kills the victim before the
poison kills the victim.
a. Efficiency and Fairness
In Type A-2 cases, Peaslee °8 and Wright' 9 agree that it would be unfair
to exonerate both tortfeasors for duplicated harm and leave the plaintiffwithout
a meaningful remedy. The same corrective justice considerations apply here as
in the multiple sufficient cause cases involving two tortfeasors. '10 In multiple
sufficient cause cases, courts impose liability to prevent the unfairness that
would result from letting each tortfeasor avoid liability by hiding behind the
fault of the other."' Imposing the same liability for duplicated harm in Type
A-2 cases does not violate the policy against giving the plaintiff a windfall. It
simply restores the plaintiff to the position she would have occupied if no tort
had occurred. Therefore, from a corrective justice point of view, eitherXor Y
or both should be held liable.
Also, imposing liability for duplicated harm on the tortfeasor that caused
the harm in a Type A-2 case usually will further the tort goal of deterrence.
Whether the deterrence goal is met depends on the sequence of events and the
knowledge of the tortfeasor. In the second variation of Example 1 (a Type A-2
case), the primary measure of damages is the diminution in market value of the
plaintiff's building. X can argue against liability for substantial damages,
claiming that the plaintiffs building had no value at the time of its destruction
due to fire Y. Y can make a similar argument. Accepting both arguments,
neither tortfeasor would be liable for the duplicated harm. Yet, some liability
is necessary because the only way to preserve the plaintiff s building is to deter
both X and Y from careless burning.
Imposing liability on X and Y for the full value of any harm arising from
injuries they cause (including duplicated harm) is useful because it gives them
an incentive to avoid negligent behavior. This is an example ofa "simultaneous
joint tort"l 12 that requires a minimum (or fixed)"13 amount of care by both Xand
Yto avoid plaintiff's loss. To deter both Xand Yfrom negligently lighting their
respective fires, it is necessary that they understand that each will be
individually liable for the full value of the harm caused by the fire even if
another tortfeasor duplicates the harm. Knowing this, at least one of the actors
will be induced to not light a fire, thereby casting the entire potential liability
108. Peaslee, supra note 1l, at 1131, 1138.
109. Wright, supra note 15, at 1800-01.
110. Peaslee, supra note 11, at 1131, 1137; Wright, supra note 15, at 1798.
111. Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914 (Wis. 1927).
112. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30, at 190. A tort can be "simultaneous" in this
sense even if the tortious acts do not occur at the same time. Id.
113. Id. at 197.
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on the other actor."4 The prospect of bearing the entire liability will induce the
other actor to refrain from lighting a fire, and the loss will be avoided." 5
Adequate deterrence is achieved by imposing liability onXalone in the second
variation of Example I because deterrence is based on the actor's incentives
before the loss occurs. Y has adequate pre-loss incentives to refrain from
negligent burning because Y faces the prospect of full liability for all harm
(including duplicated harm), not knowing in advance that the other fire would
have previously destroyed the building.
On the other hand, if either actor (or both) knows that the other has already
lit (or would inevitably light) a fire that would bum the building, then optimal
deterrence cannot be achieved by imposing liability on that actor for the
duplicated harm." 6 Any investment that such an actor makes to prevent
duplicated harm is wasted in an economic sense because the harm "will occur
anyway."" 17 The only deterrence rationale for imposing liability on an actor
with such knowledge is to avoid the risk of strategic behavior. For example, if
the law exonerated both Xand Yfrom liability for duplicated harm, the person
who lit the first fire would have an incentive to induce the other actor to light
a second fire in order to escape liability for duplicated harm."'
The analysis of Example 2 varies depending on whether X and Y are
intentional tortfeasors or negligent tortfeasors. In either case, both X and Y
committed separate torts, either battery if they intentionally injured the victim
or negligence if they carelessly poisoned19 or shot him. Because each
committed an actionable tort, each is obviously fully liable for all the harm that
he caused in a "but for" sense, such as pain and suffering and medical
expenses. In addition, ifXand Ywere both negligent and ifXdid not know that
Y had already poisoned the victim, then X should be fully liable for the harm
that was duplicated by Y. However, Xshould not be liable for harm duplicated
by innocent forces. Thus, X should be liable for causing a loss of earning
capacity between the time that the shot caused death and the time the victim
would have died according to the mortality tables. Conversely, ifXknew that
Yhad already poisoned the victim, then, in the absence of strategic behavior,
deterrence is not advanced by holdingXliable for the harm that was duplicated
by Y.
However, if either X or Y was an intentional tortfeasor, or if both were
intentional tortfeasors, the analysis is different. Economic theory suggests that
deliberate wrongdoers should be subject to punitive damages because liability
114. Id. at 196.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 198.
117. Id.
118. Shavell, supra note 30, at 495.
119. Even though the poison did not cause death, it might have caused illness before the
victim was shot. If this occurred, the poison caused physical harm. Therefore, the victim had
a negligence cause of action against Ybefore he was shot.
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for actual damages does not create a sufficient incentive to refrain from the
wrongful conduct. 20 Thus, ifeitherXor Y(or both) intended to kill the victim,
that person (or both persons) should be held liable for more than the victim's
actual damages (including damages for duplicated harm).
b. The Economic Loss Theory
While scholars such as Hart and Honord, 2' Wright,'22 the authors of
Prosser andKeeton,123 and King 124 agree that it is desirable to hold one or both
tortfeasors liable for duplicated harm, there is less agreement on the appropriate
theory of recovery. For example, they all agree that, in cases like Example 1,
X should be liable for all damages without a discount for the harm that fire Y
would have duplicated. Thus, Y would be exempt from liability for the
duplicated harm. However, they reach the conclusion via different theories.
Hart and Honor6 and Wright subscribe to the theory that X rather than Y
destroyed the plaintiff's building.125 Therefore, Xshould not be permitted to
set up Y's wrong as an excuse for reducing damages. 26 King and the authors
of Prosser andKeeton subscribe to the theory that Xdeprived the plaintiff of
her potential cause of action against y. 21
In most cases, holding both tortfeasors liable is the fairest result because
it increases the chances that a solvent defendant will be available for suit. In
cases involving economic harm, the authors ofProsser andKeeton suggest that
it is entirely plausible to hold both tortfeasors liable by analogy to the multiple
sufficient cause cases involving multiple tortfeasors. 28 In those cases, courts
dispense with the "but for" test and hold each tortfeasor liable if the jury finds
120. This is true for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30.
161, 186-89. Landes and Posner argue that the chances of catching the wrongdoer are low,
and thus wrongdoers who are caught should pay higher than average damages so that all
wrongdoers will be properly deterred. Id. at 160 & n.12. The damages for intentional torts
are often "too costly to measure," and courts can save the costs of calculating damages in
individual cases (and can achieve proper deterrence) by compensating all victims at the highest
amount of damages. Id. at 161. Optimal damages for intentional torts threatening death are
very high because "the nonlinear relationship between the value of life and the risk of death"
means that the amount of money necessary to compensate for the risk of death greatly
increases when the risk is high. Id. at 186-89. Finally, failing to compensate for the value of
life itself in wrongful death cases produces underdeterrence. Id.
121. HART & HONORP, supra note 97, at 239.
122. Wright, supra note 15, at 1794-96.
123. KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 52, at 354.
124. King, supra note 15, at 1363.
125. HART& HONORE, supra note 97, at 239,245-46; Wright, supra note 15, at 1794-95.
126. HART & HONORIt, supra note 97, at 239, 250-51; Wright, supra note 15, at 1798-
1801; see also Peaslee, supra note 11, at 1137, 1139.
127. KEETON ETAL., supra note 82, § 52, at 354; King, supra note 15, at 1363.
128. KEETON ETAL., supra note 82, § 52, at 354.
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that each tortfeasor contributed in a material way to the injury. 2 9 In Example
1, only fireXcaused the injury (destruction ofthe building), but both fires were
sufficient to cause the harm (loss of value of the building) either prior to or at
the time of its destruction. Accordingly, it is entirely fair to hold each tortfeasor
jointly and severally liable for the full value of plaintiffs building. Under this
theory (hereinafter referred to as the "economic loss theory"), courts are
required to create a cause of action for pure economic loss (the loss of value of
the building in Example I or the loss of earning capacity in Example 2) because
recovery does not depend on infliction of physical harm. Creating this action
should not be a serious obstacle because courts are showing an increasing
willingness to grant recovery for pure economic loss. 3 °
One argument against imposing liability on both X and Y under the
economic loss theory is based on the theory of causation discussed above. 3'
This argument (hereinafter referred to as the "attachment argument") is that the
fire that attaches is the "but for" cause of the entire loss ofvalue. This assumes
that the attached fire affects the value of the building after it attaches. Thus, any
buyer who saw the fire would buy the building, if at all, only at a reduced price.
The fire that threatens the building after the first fire attaches is preempted by
the first fire. The second fire causes no loss of value because the building had
no value when the second fire became important enough to affect the building's
value. Therefore, only one tortfeasor could be held liable under the economic
loss theory. 13
2
However, this attachment argument should not present a serious obstacle
in Example I to holding bothXand Yliable under the economic loss theory. An
identical duplicated harm problem is present in the multiple sufficient cause
cases in which two tortiously caused fires merge and burn the plaintiff's
building. In these cases, courts impose liability on both tortfeasors using the
substantial factor test. 133 These cases also involve questions of valuation of
damages as well as questions of causation. In such cases, a defendant who is
found to be a cause of the injury (the destruction of the building) under the
substantial factor test could still argue that he should not be liable for damages
because he caused no harm. That is, the building had no value when the
tortfeasor destroyed it because the other fire attached before his fire was
significant enough to affect the value of the building; the other fire duplicated
129. See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46, 49
(1920) (upholding trial court's instructions to jury that it should find the defendant liable if the
defendant's negligence was "a material or substantial element in causing plaintiffs damage").
130. E.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60,64 (Cal. 1979) (creating a cause of action
for negligent interference with prospective advantage); People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985) (same).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 82-105.
132. An exception would arise in cases in which both fires attached at the same time.
This would be a multiple sufficient cause case in which both fires would be regarded as causal.
See supra text accompanying note 100.
133. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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the harm (the loss of value) that the tortfeasor's fire would have produced. This
argument would fail because the same corrective justice policy that denies each
multiple tortfeasor the argument that he did not destroy the building because the
other fire was sufficient to destroy it also denies him the argument that he did
not reduce the value of the building because the other fire was also sufficient to
reduce the value.134 Multiple sufficient cause cases involving multiple fires
routinely impose full liability on the tortfeasors without regard to which cause
attached first. '35 If, notwithstanding the attachment argument, courts are free
to hold tortfeasors liable for duplicated harm in multiple sufficient cause cases,
they are equally free to hold tortfeasors liable for duplicated harm in successive
cause cases.
Courts can reject the attachment argument for one of two reasons. First,
they could reject the notion of preempted causes in this context on the basis that
it is an artificial construct based on the assumption that the building's value
must be determined when the first fire attaches. Cause in fact is determined in
hindsight, and a court could reasonably pick a different time to value the
building. The authors ofProsser andKeeton, for example, assert that "[v]alue
is an estimate of worth at the time and place of the wrong."'136 Therefore, to
value the building courts should consider the forces in operation when the
defendant caused the harm. 137 In the merged fire cases, no reduction in value
is appropriate, according to the authors of Prosser and Keeton, "since any
decrease in value of the property before destruction must be attributed equally
to the threat of each fire."'' 38 In contrast, Hart and Honor6 assert that in the
merged fire cases neither fire reduced the value of the building until the building
was actually burned. 39 King's attachment approach to valuing damages is
entirely reasonable, but so are those suggested by Hart and Honor6 and by the
authors of Prosser and Keeton. A court can circumvent the attachment
argument against imposing liability on both Xand Yin the second variation of
Example 1 by valuing damages as the authors of Prosser and Keeton would.
The second way a court could avoid using the attachment argument is
simply to reject the causation requirement because justice so demands. Unlike
the first variation, justice indeed demands in the second variation of Example 1
that both culpable tortfeasors be responsible for placing the plaintiff in the
position she would have occupied if neither fire had occurred. If courts are free
to modify the rules pertaining to causation of injury in the multiple sufficient
cause cases because of fairness concerns, they are equally free to modify the
134. King, supra note 15, at 1362-63; Wright, supra note 15, at 1798.
135. See, e.g., Miller v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 135 P. 845 (Idaho 1913) (no attachment
argument was raised or considered); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co.,
179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920) (same).
136. KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 52, at 353.
137. Id.
138. Id. § 52, at 353 n.76.
139. HART & HONORt, supra note 97, at 238.
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rules of causation of harm in duplicated harm cases because of identical
concerns.
In one exceptional situation, the tortfeasor should not be liable for the
duplicated harm: when the plaintiff's negligence is one of two successive
causes of duplicated harm. Here, the plaintiff cannot make a corrective justice
argument that liability is necessary to prevent one tortfeasor from benefitting
from the negligence of another tortfeasor. It is appropriate to exempt the
plaintiff from recovering damages for harm caused by his own misconduct.
Thus, when the victim's life expectancy is at issue, there is no correctivejustice
reason to exclude evidence that the victim had bad personal habits, such as
smoking or drinking, in conjunction with mortality table evidence.
3. Actual Force Is Innocent and Potential Force Is Tortious
(Type A-3 Cases)
The third variation of Example 1 is the case where fire X (the fire that
burned the building) is of innocent origin and fire Yis of tortious origin. There
are no cases imposing liability for duplicated harm in this situation, and
scholars generally do not support such liability. 140 Under the economic loss
theory, it would.be possible to hold Yliable to the plaintiff for loss of value of
the building. However, courts are very unlikely to apply the economic loss
theory in Type A-3 cases because awarding damages would give the plaintiff
a windfall. The plaintiff would have lost the full value of the building even if
Yhad not started the subsequent fire. Because one cause is innocent, there is
no fairness justification for displacing the normal measure of damages.
There is also no efficiency reason for holding Y liable for the duplicated
harm. These cases are like the Type A-1 cases discussed previously.' 41
Efficiency would not be advanced by imposing liability on the tortfeasor for the
duplicated harm because the tortfeasor cannot do anything to prevent the harm.
Therefore, any investment the tortfeasor makes to prevent the harm is wasted
in an economic sense.
B. One Force Produces an Accident or Illness and a Second Force
Produces an Accident or Illness that Duplicates Harm
This section of the Article analyzes situations in which an accident or
illness produces actual harm and is followed by a second accident or illness that
duplicates some or all of the harm produced by the first force. Again, three
variations of this fact pattern illustrate the full range of possible cases under
consideration in this section: (1) the first occurrence is tortious and the second
occurrence is innocent (Type B-I); (2) both occurrences are tortious (Type
140. HART& HONORE, supra note 97, at250-51; Peaslee, supra note 11, at 1133; Wright,
supra note 15, at 1798.
141. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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B-2); and (3) the first occurrence is innocent and the second is tortious (Type
B-3). The following table summarizes the results from the analysis of these
variations:
Table B
Type B-1 Type B-2 Type B-3
Force 1 (tortious) Force 1 (tortious) Force 1
Force 2 Force 2 (tortious) (innocent)
(innocent) Force 2 (tortious)
Liability for No Force 1: Yes No
duplicated harm? Force 2: No
Deterrence No Force 1: Yes No
requires liability? Force 2: No
Fairness requires No Force 1: Yes No
liability? Force 2: Yes
1. The First Force Is Tortious and the Second Is Innocent (Type B-I Cases)
Type B-1 situations occur when a tortfeasor causes injury, and then a
subsequent non-tortious event causes another actual accident or illness that
duplicates some or all of the harm originally caused by the tortfeasor 42 In
such cases, most courts allow the tortfeasor to escape liability forthe duplicated
portion of the harm.143 They reason that this is fair because the alternative,
which is to ignore the plaintiff's actual future (the subsequent actual event
duplicating plaintiff s harm) and award damages on the basis of the plaintiff's
probable future (based on mortality tables), would place the plaintiff in a better
position than he would have been in absent the tort.'"
From a policy perspective these rulings are correct. Neither efficiency nor
fairness is promoted by imposing liability on a tortfeasor for harm duplicated
by innocent forces. As in the Type A-I cases, there is one category of Type B-
1 cases that fails to produce optimal efficiency: cases in which damages are
reduced for lost earning capacity on the basis of subsequent events that shorten
the plaintiff's life expectancy. In calculating damages for lost earning capacity,
142. Type B-1 cases and Type A-I cases are analogous.
143. See cases cited infra notes 145-50; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910
cmt. b at 469-70 (1979) (valuing loss in light of all facts known at the time of trial regardless
of whether those facts show that the damages are greater or less than they would have been
if the estimate had been made at the time of the loss); HART & HONORE, supra note 97, at 248;
Harvey McGregor, Variations on an Enigma: Successive Causes ofPersonal Injury, 33 MOD.
L. REv. 378, 382-83 (1970); Wright, supra note 15, at 1798-1801.
144. See Tucker v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711-12 (D. Md. 1973).
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optimal deterrence requires the use of average life expectancy rather than the
victim's actual life expectancy calculated in light of specific illnesses and
injuries. The reasons for this are set out in detail in Part V of this Article.
In applying this principle, courts have held that when the tortfeasor inflicts
injuries that cause future loss of earning capacity, the tortfeasor is not liable for
lost earning capacity after the victim suffers a stroke,4 5 a spinal injury, 4 6 or
develops a heart condition'47 that deprives him of all capacity to earn money.
Likewise, if a tortiously disabled victim dies from an unrelated cause, the
victim's estate cannot recover damages under a survival statute for lost earning
capacity beyond the date of the victim's death. 48 If the plaintiff in a wrongful
death case dies, the estate is entitled to compensation for loss of the decedent's
support between the time of the decedent's death and the time of the plaintiff s
death, but not thereafter.'49 Similarly, a tortfeasor who negligently causes a
collision with a ship, necessitating that the ship be put in dry-dock for repairs,
must pay for the cost of repairs. However, the tortfeasor does not have to pay
either for the cost of dry-dock or for the loss of income during the dry-dock
period if a subsequent storm causes other harm that necessitates dry-dock for
a sufficient length of time to make the collision repairs. 50
Subsequent causes that duplicate harm are distinguishable from subsequent
causes that terminate harm. For example, where the defendant tortiously bums
a plaintiff's leg, and the leg is subsequently amputated due to an unrelated
cause, the defendant is only liable for pain and suffering between the time of the
original accident and the amputation.' 5' Here, the second accident ended the
pain caused by the first accident, but it also duplicated any lost earning capacity
caused by the first accident. 5
2
A minority of courts have reached contrary results, holding that tortiously
145. Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 234 N.W.2d 332, 344 (Wis.
1975).
146. Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 155, 159, 163, 165, 169, 173 (H.L.
1981); see also Russell v. Cox, No. 88-2070, 1989 WL 165162, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 8,
1989) (per curiam) (relieving liability where a subsequent shoulder injury duplicates harm
caused by first shoulder injury).
147. Harris v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 58 F.3d 1140, 1144-45 (6th Cir. 1995); see also
Stevens v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 594, 599 (1st Cir. 1996).
148. Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1985);
Tucker, 356 F. Supp. at 710-11; Rouse v. Michigan United Rys. Co., 129 N.W. 719, 721
(Mich. 1911); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. e, § 926A cmt. a (1979) (stating
that if the victim dies before trial from an unrelated cause, the defendant is not liable for loss
of earnings, pain and suffering, or mental distress after the time of death).
149. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 347 (1937); In re Gulf Oil Corp,
172 F. Supp. 911, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); The City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1930).
150. The Pocahontas, 109 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir. 1940).
15 1. See Jurney v. Lubeznik, 218 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
152. See id.
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disabled plaintiffs could recover for loss of earning capacity for the time period
after they developed diseases that were equally disabling.'53 Some workers'
compensation cases have also awarded damages for harm duplicated by
subsequent diseases.'54 The policy analysis discussed above'"s indicates that
these cases were wrongly decided. However, the workers' compensation cases
may be distinguishable from tort cases for two reasons. First, they are not
concerned with correctivejustice. Workers' compensation is a statutory scheme
designed to compensate injured workers without regard to the fault of either the
employer or the employee. Therefore, the notion of restoring plaintiff to the
position he would have occupied "but for" the tort does not apply. Second,
workers' compensation statutes strictly limit recovery. Imposing liability for
duplicated harm in workers' compensation cases does not create the same risk
of excessive liability as imposing liability in tort cases.
2. Both Forces Are Tortious (Type B-2 Cases)
Type B-2 cases arise when a tortfeasor injures the plaintiff, and in an
unrelated event, a second tortfeasor causes an injury that duplicates some or all
of the harm caused by the first accident. Generally, courts hold the first
tortfeasor liable for all the harm caused by the first accident, including the
duplicated harm. 56 Thus, the second tortfeasor is liable only for the additional
harm resulting from the second accident.
Successive accident cases that clearly fall into this pattern are relatively
rare. Most successive accidents produce divisible injuries caused by each
tortfeasor. These cases often involve difficult problems of proving which
tortfeasor caused which injuries.5 7 Courts resolve these problems using special
rules for apportioning damages. 5 Cases decided under these rules may
153. E.g., Moore v. The Sally J., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (finding
that hand injuries and multiple sclerosis resulted in parallel harm); Buchalski v. Universal
Marine Corp., 393 F. Supp. 246,251 (W.D. Wash. 1975) (finding that plaintiff's development
of heart disease does not reduce defendant's liability); Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co., 145 Cal. Rptr.
47, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (stating, in a multiple sclerosis case, that "the value of harm done
or the damages is an estimate of worth at the time and place of the wrong").
154. E.g., McClaney v. Dictaphone/Pitney Bowes, 659 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Harwood v. Wyken Colliery Co., 2 K.B. 158, 168-69 (Eng. C.A. 1913).
155. See supra text accompanying note 144.
156. See cases cited infra notes 160-63, 173. Several scholars agree with this approach.
HART & HONORt, supra note 97, at 247-48; Carpenter, supra note 9, at 950-51; McGregor,
supra note 143, at 380-81; D.M.A. Strachan, The Scope and Application of the "But For"
Causal Test, 33 MOD. L. REv. 386, 394-95 (1970); Wright, supra note 15, at 1798-1801.
157. E.g., Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Mich. 1961) (chain automobile
accident).
158. See, e.g., id. at 36-37 (finding defendants jointly and severally liable for all harm
unless they can establish a basis for apportioning damages); Pang v. Minch, 559 N.E.2d 1313,
1324 (Ohio 1990) (finding that once the plaintiff proves that each defendant caused some
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sometimes involve issues of duplicated harm.5 9 However, those issues may
never be resolved if the evidence is unclear. Under those circumstances, the
case will be decided on the basis of which party has the burden of proof with
regard to apportioning damages.
The leading case raising the question of duplicated harm in this context is
the English case Baker v. Willoughby."6 In Baker, the first tortfeasor injured
the plaintiff's leg in an automobile accident,'61 and in a later unrelated incident
the second tortfeasor shot the plaintiff in the leg and inflicted a wound that
necessitated amputation. 162 In a suit against the first tortfeasor, the House of
Lords held the defendant liable for disability to the leg including the period of
time after the leg was amputated.163 Stene v. Evans,'64 another English case, is
similar. There, the first tortfeasor negligently injured plaintiff, causing a twenty
percent disability. 65 The second tortfeasor, in an unrelated accident, totally
disabled plaintiff.'6 The court held the first tortfeasor liable for the twenty
percent disability without reduction for the subsequent accident. 167
damage, the burden of apportioning damages is on the defendants); Phennah v. Whalen,
621 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (same). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965); Gerald W. Boston, Apportionment of Harm in Tort Law: A
Proposed Restatement, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 267 (1996).
159. E.g., Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Mo. 1965) (finding
both tortfeasors jointly and severally liable where the first tortfeasor inflicted injuries that
would have killed the decedents; and before the decedents died, a second tortfeasor inflicted
injuries that were also sufficient to kill them), overruled on other grounds by Bennett v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Mo. 1995). Quoting from Brantley
v. Couch, 383 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), the Glick court stated:
[W]here the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might
have resulted from the act of the other tort-feasor, and the injured person may at his
option or election institute suit for the resulting damages against any one or more of such
tort-feasors separately, or against any number or all of them jointly.
Glick, 396 S.W.2d at 613.
160. 2 W.L.R. 50 (H.L. 1970) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.); see also Spose v. Ragu
Foods, Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (accident causing partial disability
followed by crime causing total disability).
161. Baker, 2 W.L.R. at 52.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 57-58.
164. [1958] 14 D.L.R. (2d) 73 (Alta.).
165. Id. at 74, 78.
166. Id. at 75-76.
167. Id. at 78.
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a. Commonwealth Cases
The Commonwealth cases have evolved the most coherent rationale for the
rule in successive injury cases. The early cases relied on a conceptual rationale
that the second harm-producing event should not cut offthe liability of the first
tortfeasor because the disability caused by the first tortfeasor persisted even
after the second accident.'68 Thus, the court in Stene v. Evans reasoned that
because the first tortfeasor caused a twenty percent disability, the second
accident, which was totally disabling, could only cause an eighty percent
disability. 69 Hence, the disability caused by the first tortfeasor continued
beyond the second accident. Ifthe second accident had shortened the plaintiff's
life, the liability of the first tortfeasor would terminate at the point of death
because the original disability would not persist beyond death.
More recent Commonwealth cases do not rely on this conceptual
rationale.17 ° Instead, these successive injury cases were decided on the basis of
policy. In Type B-1 cases, the courts hold that a succeeding non-tortious
accident or illness that duplicates the harm caused by the prior tortious injury
cuts off the liability of the first tortfeasor for harm duplicated by the second
accident. 7 ' There, the dominant principle of damages, full compensation, is
achieved by putting the plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied
if he had not sustained the wrong.'72 However, in Type B-2 cases in which the
second injury is tortious, courts hold the first tortfeasor liable as though the
second tort had not occurred. '73 They hold the second tortfeasor liable only for
the balance of the plaintiff s damages.'74 This approach avoids the injustice of
using the "but for" rule to allow both tortfeasors to escape liability for the
duplicated portion of the harm.'
b. Efficiency and Fairness
From a corrective justice perspective, Type B-2 cases, in which both
168. See Stene, 14 D.L.R (2d) at 78; Baker, 2 W.L.R. at 57.
169. Stene, 14 D.L.R (2d) at 78.
170. See cases cited infra notes 171-75.
171. Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 155, 169 (H.L. 1981); Penner v.
Mitchell [1978] 5 W.W.R. 328, 337 (Alta.).
172. See Penner, 5 W.W.R. at 332-33.
173. Id. at 334; see also Taylor v. Simonis, 11437 of 1995 BC9700920 (Supreme Court
of New South Wales, Common Law Division, 1997).
174. For example, Performance Cars, Ltd. v. Abraham involved successive collisions that
both caused damage to the plaintiff's automobile which necessitated repainting the lower part
of the car. [1962] 1 Q.B. 33 (1961). The court held that the tortfeasor who caused the second
collision was not liable for the cost of the repainting. Id. at 35-42.
175. Jobling, 3 W.L.R. at 165; Penner, 5 W.W.R. at 335; see also Taylor v. Simonis,
11437 of 1995 BC9700920 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division,
1997).
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successive forcesare tortious, and Type A-2 cases, in which both the actual and
potential forces are tortious, are similar. It is desirable to hold at least one
tortfeasor liable for duplicated harm because the plaintiff should have a
remedy. 76 Furthermore, both tortfeasors should be held liable if this is possible
without either offending conventional notions of causation or creating
unacceptably difficult proofproblems. However, it is more feasible to impose
liability for the duplicated harm on the first tortfeasor than on the second due
to practical proof problems discussed below.
The efficiency analysis in the Type B-2 cases is also similar to that in Type
A-2 cases. As a general rule, tortfeasors should not be held liable for harm that
they could not have prevented. 77 Therefore, the second tortfeasor should not
be liable for the duplicated harm because he could have done nothing to prevent
the original loss. The major exception is that liability for duplicated harm is
justified if it is necessary to prevent strategic behavior. Strategic behavior
occurs when the first tortfeasor induces a second tortfeasor to cause duplicated
harm under the belief that both tortfeasors will escape liability for the
duplicated harm.
There is an efficiency argument for imposing liability on the first tortfeasor
for the duplicated harm. Not knowing that the second tort was going to occur,
the first tortfeasor occupies the position of a simultaneous joint tortfeasor. 171
Potential liability must be great enough to induce the tortfeasor to guard against
harm that might be duplicated by other tortfeasors unless he knows that the
other torts will inevitably occur. Therefore, to achieve appropriate deterrence,
the scope of liability must include harm duplicated by other tortfeasors.
This argument has implications for the use of mortality tables to calculate
life expectancy in order to determine loss of earning capacity. Standard
mortality tables consider torts and crimes when calculating life expectancy.
The efficiency argument suggests that these tables should estimate life
expectancy without taking torts and crimes into account.
In Type B-2 cases, the practice of imposing liability on the first tortfeasor
for duplicated harm is consistent with the dual tort goals of fairness and
efficiency. Thus far, courts have been unwilling to place liability on the second
tortfeasor in Type B-2 cases. 179 The practice of exonerating the second
tortfeasor is efficient. However, it may not be fair, particularly in cases in
which ajudgment against the first tortfeasor is uncollectible. There are at least
two theories that courts could use to hold the second tortfeasor liable. First,
some scholars suggest holding the second tortfeasor liable on the theory that he
deprived the plaintiff of her action against the first tortfeasor for the duplicated
176. See supra text accompanying note 111.
177. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
179. See Fredericks v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 16 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (Ohio Ct. App.
1938) (finding liability in multiple sufficient cause cases when the forces are concurrent, but
not when they are successive).
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harm. ' Although this is a plausible theory of liability, it has the disadvantage
of exempting the first tortfeasor from liability.
A second approach would hold both tortfeasors liable based on the
economic loss theory.' This theory would work if courts valued the loss at the
time of the second accident rather than at the time of the first accident. Under
this theory, courts would regard the first tortfeasor as the sole cause of the loss
of value between the first injury and the second injury and regard both
wrongdoers as the multiple sufficient causes of the duplicated loss of value after
the second injury. This way, each tortfeasor would be jointly and severally
liable for the duplicated harm because each was a substantial factor in
producing that harm.
Courts are not likely to apply this economic loss theory to Type B-2
cases for two reasons. First, this theory may represent too great a departure
from the usual analysis of causation to be acceptable to courts. Second, the
theory presents impossibly difficult problems of proof when applied
comprehensively to Type B-2 cases. Courts would have to examine all prior
forces in the life of the victim or the victim's property to determine which forces
produced reductions in value. Next, they would have to determine which of
those forces were tortious and which were innocent. Finally, courts would have
to apportion prior reductions in value between innocent and tortious causes so
that they could hold the tortfeasor liable only for the harm duplicated by
tortious causes. To circumvent these proof problems, courts would have to
strictly limit the economic loss theory to cases where evidence of a prior
tortious force duplicating the loss is clear.
The recent Commonwealth cases probably represent the most acceptable
approach to Type B-2 cases. They provide plaintiffs with a reasonable remedy,
they fit in well with traditional views of causation, and they do not create
unusually difficult problems of proof.
3. The First Force Is Innocent and the Second Is Tortious (Type B-3 Cases)
The third variation of cases in this section involves those in which the first
occurrence results from innocent forces and the second results from tortious
forces.' 2 Here, courts exonerate tortfeasors because their conduct caused no
harm; the loss occurred before the tortious conduct took place.' 18 3 For example,
in lost earning capacity cases, in which the victim has an established earning
180. King, supra note 15, at 1362-63; McGregor, supra note 143, at 381; see also HART
& HONORt, supra note 97, at 247-48.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 120-39.
182. Type B-3 cases are analogous to Type A-3 cases.
183. See Carpenter, supra note 9 at 949-50; McGregor, supra note 143, at 382; Strachan,
supra note 156, at 392; Wright, supra note 15, at 1799; see also Kerry v. England, 1898 App.
Cas. 742, 744 (P.C. 1898) (appeal taken from L.C.) (exonerating tortfeasor responsible for
giving a fatal dose of tartar emetic because of the victim's preexisting disease).
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capacity at the time of trial, courts base damages on the loss of that existing
capacity.8 4 That is, courts give tortfeasors the benefit of the preexisting forces
that reduced the plaintiff's capacity to earn money prior to the tortious injury
even though the tortfeasor's conduct was sufficient to duplicate the reduction
in earning capacity. Thus, if the plaintiff is a fast food worker, courts will limit
the plaintiffs recovery to what she could earn as a fast food worker even
though the injury was sufficient to destroy a greater earning capacity.
Another example of Type B-3 cases are those awarding compensation for
destruction of property. Courts award damages on the basis of the property's
fair market value at the time of the harm.1"5 Thus, a building in a bad
neighborhood is worth less than the same building in a good neighborhood.
Courts give the defendants the benefit of all preexisting market forces that have
reduced the value of the property before the defendant destroyed it.
These cases are clearly correct. Neither efficiency nor fairness requires that
the tortfeasor be held liable for harm duplicated by innocent forces.8 6
IV. ToRTIous CONDUCT CAUSING BENEFIT TO THE PLAINTIFF
It is possible for a defendant's tortious conduct to cause a benefit to the
plaintiff as well as a detriment. On occasion, courts permit the defendant to
mitigate damages by offsetting the benefit against the harm. Section 920 ofthe
Restatement (Second) of Torts sets out the "benefit rule" as follows:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest
of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.'87
The compensation objective of tort law is to put the plaintiff as nearly as
possible in the position she would have occupied if the defendant's wrong had
caused no injury. 8 The plaintiff should be fully compensated, but should not
recover any windfall. '89 The benefit rule is a corollary of the tort principle of
compensation'" because it prevents plaintiff from profiting from a windfall.
The benefit rule is designed to help courts achieve corrective justice in awarding
damages.
184. Robbins v. State, 728 So. 2d 991, 997 (La. Ct. App. 1999); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(b) cmts. c-d at 524-26 (1979).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 cmt. c at 535 (1979) (noting that
"'value' includes market value and value to the owner").
186. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
188. 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 9, § 25.1, at 493.
189. DAN B. DOBBS, LAWOF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQuITY-RESTITUTION § 3.1, at 210
(2d ed. 1993).
190. 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 9, § 25.4, at 519.
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The following examples illustrate this rule. If a trespasser builds a trestle
or deposits soil on the plaintiff's land, the value of the trestle timbers as
merchandise or the increased value of the land due to the soil will be set off
against the other damages. 9' If the trespass is a net benefit, the trespasser will
be liable for nominal damages only. 92 In the New Jersey case Gracia v.
Meiselman,93 a patient consented to a highly beneficial operation, but the
surgeon negligently failed to inform the patient ofa risk of minor nerve damage
inherent in the operation.' 94 Nerve damage occurred and the patient sued,
alleging that he would not have consented to the operation if he had known of
the risk.' 95 The court held that thejury must be instructed to "subtract from the
damages proximately caused by the nerve damage the benefits received from the
operation."196 Thus, if a properly performed operation ultimately benefits the
plaintiff and no alternative treatment options are available, the plaintiff will
recover no damages.' 97
One of the most common uses of the benefit rule involves the wrongful
conception of a normal healthy child, as might occur after a tubal ligation or
vasectomy fails. One line of authority holds that the birth is a net benefit as a
matter of law; therefore, the parents have no action for the cost of raising the
child.198 Another line of authority holds that thejury must decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the child is a net detriment, in which case the parents'
recovery for the cost of raising the child would be reduced by the benefits they
are expected to receive in the form of companionship, affection, and the like. ,99
These cases represent a somewhat unusual application of the benefit rule. The
Restatement version of the benefit rule does not apply in wrongful conception
cases because the interest benefitted by the child (psychological) is different
than the interest harmed (financial) by the defendant.200
The benefit rule is an equitable doctrine20 1 which is applied somewhat
inconsistently for two reasons. First, courts are reluctant to permit a defendant
to impose an unwanted benefit on a plaintiff. Thus, in Burtraw v. Clark,°2 the
defendant trespassed on the plaintiff's land by digging a drainage ditch across
191. Meier v. Portland Cable Ry. Co., 19 P. 610,616 (Or. 1888); Murphy v. City of Fond
du Lac, 23 Wis. 365, 366 (1868).
192. Meier, 19 P. at 616; Murphy, 23 Wis. at 366.
193. 531 A.2d 1373 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
194. Id. at 1373.
195. Id. at 1373-74.
196. Id. at 1379.
197. Id.
198. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721-22 (Ala. 1982); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450
So. 2d 822,823-24 (Fla. 1984); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
199. Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429,435 (Md. 1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1,
6 (Mass. 1990); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
201. See Gracia, 531 A.2d at 1378.
202. 61 N.W. 552, 552 (Mich. 1894).
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it. The landowner sued, claiming the cost of filling in the ditch as damages. °3
The defendant contended that there were no damages because the ditch
enhanced the value of the land.2' The court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover the cost of filling in the ditch if the jury found that he intended to fill
it in. 05 If the jury found, however, that the plaintiff intended to keep the ditch
and that the ditch increased the value of the land, then the plaintiff would be
entitled to nominal damages only. 6
Second, the law is unwilling to permit tortfeasors to take advantage of
benefits conferred on victims by third parties. Under the collateral source rule,
"payments made to or benefits.conferred on the injured party from other sources
are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable."2 7 An obvious application
of this rule permits a plaintiff to recover medical expenses that have been paid
by an insurance company. Although less obvious, it also prevents a defendant
in a wrongful death case brought by the spouse of the victim from introducing
evidence that plaintiff has remarried.20 8
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW
The preceding analysis illustrates that in valuing damages in tort cases
courts generally exonerate tortfeasors only from liability for harm that would
have been duplicated by other innocent causes. This is generally consistent with
economic theory. In implementing this approach, courts employ two significant
practices. First, when there is no specific evidence of the victim's probable
future, courts cut off liability for future harm, such as lost earning capacity,
after the date when the mortality tables project that the victim's death would
have duplicated that harm. Second, when the litigants produce specific
evidence to show that the victim's harm would have been duplicated either
earlier or later than indicated by the mortality tables, courts cut off the
defendant's liability as of that date.
Pursuant to the second practice, defendants can reduce their damages by
showing that the victim was suffering from a preexisting disease or infirmity,
or that the victim subsequently contracted a disease, that either did or will
eventually duplicate the harm caused by the defendant. Defendants can also
show that the plaintiff's harm would have been duplicated by an actual or
potential subsequent accident. Plaintiffs likewise can obtain greater damages




205. Id. at 553.
206. Id.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979).
208. Taylor v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 637 P.2d 726, 729-30 (Ariz. 1981).
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The second practice-adjusting the victim's life expectancy by considering
specific evidence of the victim's good health, bad health, and past and future
accidents-is not consistent with the economic theory of tort law. This practice
systematically results in underdeterrence because, on average, it holds
defendants liable for less harm than they cause. The effect of the practice is to
hold defendants liable for average damages, by reference to mortality tables, in
cases in which specific evidence of the victim's actual or potential future is not
available and to hold defendants liable for less than average damages when
specific evidence is available. Thus, defendants as a whole are underdeterred
because they are held liable for less harm than they cause. To state the point
differently, optimal deterrence does not require the use of specific evidence in
conjunction with mortality tables because the tables already take into account
the accidents that are the stuff of specific evidence.
As a practical matter, underdeterrence occurs because specific evidence is
almost always evidence offered by a defendant of an actual or potential disease
or accident that caused or would have caused a duplication of harm sooner than
predicted by mortality tables. In theory, plaintiffs can present evidence that the
victim would have lived longer than predicted by the mortality tables, but such
evidence is usually too scarce and too weak to bring the total damages awarded
to plaintiffs up to an amount equal to the amount of harm that defendants cause.
Consider death by non-natural causes. Accidents are the fifth leading cause
of death for all age groups.20 9 For certain groups, such as white males between
the ages of 25 and 44, accidents are the leading cause of death." ° When the
evidence is available, defendants can reduce their liability by showing actual
and potential accidents. Yet, in cases in which the defendants have no such
evidence, plaintiffs will find it virtually impossible to prove that the victim
would have lived appreciably longer than average. The plaintiff can introduce
evidence that the victim had a relatively safe occupation, but this evidence is
quite weak. Also, it has no tendency to negate future non-occupational
accidents, such as traffic accidents. Therefore, the plaintiffs opportunity for
enlarging damages by showing above-average life expectancy is more restricted
than the defendant's opportunity for decreasing damages.
Death caused by disease creates similar problems for plaintiffs. The kind
of evidence that a plaintiff can use to show that the victim would have lived
longer than average is limited to such things as the victim's general good health
and good habits. This type of evidence is comparatively weak. It is unlikely
to result in a sufficient number of above-average awards to counterbalance the
below-average awards in cases in which defendants have evidence of shortened
life expectancy. For example, in cases in which the defendant can show that a
young victim is suffering from a terminal illness, the likely result will be an
award of damages well below the average. Yet, when the plaintiff can show
that an equally young victim was healthy and had good habits, the result will
209. See Anderson et al., supra note 35.
210. Id. tbl.7 at28.
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never be an award of damages sufficiently above average to bring the damages
in all such cases up to the average.
A system that ignores the plaintiff's individual circumstances and awards
damages only on the basis of average life expectancy of a person of the
plaintiff's age is more likely to produce optimal deterrence. It is also likely to
be more administratively efficient than the present system. However, courts
could not adopt an average damage approach without abandoning the "first
purpose of tort law,""' which is to restore the plaintiffto the position she would
have occupied if the tort had not occurred. Courts can only restore the plaintiff
to her rightful position by using precise information about what that position
would have been. Awarding average damages in all cases would almost always
frustrate this fundamental tort policy because most plaintiffs would get either
a windfall or a shortfall. For this reason, courts are unlikely to adopt an
average damage approach.
The way courts value damages tells us much about the tort system.
Namely, tort law is more concerned with correctivejustice than with deterrence.
As Judge Posner stated in Brackett v. Peters:
[TIort law, which has compensatory as well as deterrent functions, focuses
on injury, while criminal law, which emphasizes deterrence and
incapacitation, focuses on the dangerousness of the defendant's conduct.
There is no tort liability without proof of injury, but there are plenty of
crimes that are punishable though no injury resulted-many attempts and
conspiracies, for example. A victim's eggshell skull may require a refined
adjustment in damages to reflect the likelihood that the victim -would
because of his vulnerability have been injured sooner or later nontortiously.
But a criminal assailant is punishable as a first-degree murderer "no matter
how feeble the spark" of life that his blow extinguished. Uncompleted
crimes are often punished severely; and when injury or death ensues from
deliberate wrongdoing .... the criminal law comes down heavily on the
defendant without worrying overmuch about the precise amount of harm
inflicted."'
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTIPLE SUFFICIENT CAUSE CASES
In multiple sufficient cause cases, in which one of the forces was innocent,
courts are split on the question of whether the tortfeasor should be liable.1 3
Absent strategic behavior, there is no efficiency reason to impose liability on the
tortfeasor when one of the forces was non-tortious." 4 The corrective justice
argument for imposing liability is also quite weak because liability places the
plaintiff in a better position than she would have occupied if the tort had not
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a at 452 (1979).
212. 11 F.3d 78, 82 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
213. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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occurred. The essence of the fairness argument is that it is wrong to allow a
culpable tortfeasor to escape liability to an innocent plaintiff by hiding behind
an innocent force. The duplicated harm cases provide strong evidence that this
fairness argument is too weak to warrant the imposition of liability.
In duplicated harm cases, courts hold at least one tortfeasor liable for
duplicated harm when all duplicating forces are tortious. The unfairness of
denying recovery to an innocent plaintiff by allowing each wrongdoer to assert
the wrong of the other is manifest. Imposing liability places the plaintiff in the
position she would have occupied if no tort had occurred. When one force is
innocent, however, the usual damage rule applies and the plaintiff bears the
burden of the duplicated losses. This is fair because the tort leaves the plaintiff
no worse off than if the tort had not occurred. To the contrary, imposing
liability violates the rule against awarding windfalls.
The near universality of the principle that applies in duplicated harm cases
involving an innocent force, and the pervasiveness of such cases, suggests that
fairness considerations do not warrant liability in multiple sufficient cause cases
involving an innocent force. The early multiple sufficient cause cases had it
right.2 5 Tortfeasors should be liable only if all duplicating forces are tortious.
When one of the forces is innocent in the multiple sufficient cause cases, the
plaintiff has no better fairness argument for suspending the normal rules of
causation than do plaintiffs in the duplicated harm cases. From a policy
perspective, the duplicated harm scenario and the multiple sufficient cause
scenario are indistinguishable. The factual distinction between the scenarios is
that when there are multiple sufficient causes, the innocent force concurs with
the culpable force, but when the harm is duplicated, the innocent force does not
necessarily concur in time. This distinction might have some emotional appeal,
but it is irrelevant from a policy perspective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Most tort cases in which compensation is awarded for economic loss
involve duplicated harm. This Article identifies two classes of duplicated harm
cases, examines them in light of the policies underlying tort law, and offers
suggestions for resolving difficult problems raised by these cases. This
examination concludes that courts generally exonerate tortfeasors from liability
for the duplicated portion of harm so long as the other force duplicating the
harm was innocent. If all forces are tortious, courts generally hold one
tortfeasor liable for the duplicated portion of the harm. This approach furthers
the twin tort objectives of efficiency and fairness. When forced to choose
between these two objectives in implementing specific details of the rules,
however, the courts have opted for fairness rather than efficiency. This decision
reflects the priorities of the tort system. This examination also has important
215. See, e.g., Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 561
(Wis. 1898) (no liability if one of two fires is of innocent origin).
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implications for how multiple sufficient cause cases involving innocent forces
ought to be resolved.
The duplicated harm problem is complex because it presents itself in so
many forms. No simple rule pertaining to this issue can produce ideal results
in all cases. In the end, we must recognize that general rules of thumb can
provide useful guidelines in deciding these cases, but they should not be
controlling in situations where they fail to achieve desirable results.
The need for certainty and predictability in valuing damages is not as great
as in some areas of law. A defendant who knows that he might be liable if he
carelessly starts a dangerous fire knows enough to regulate his conduct. He
does not need to know precisely how damages will be calculated in the lawsuits
that might be brought against him in order to know that he should not start the
fire. Thus, there is no reason to deny courts the flexibility they require to decide
the diverse cases that raise this difficult damage valuation issue.
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